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Abstract—Trillions of network packets are sent over the
Internet to destinations which do not exist. This ‘darknet’ traffic
captures the activity of botnets and other malicious campaigns
aiming to discover and compromise devices around the world. In
order to mine threat intelligence from this data, one must be able
to handle large streams of logs and represent the traffic patterns
in a meaningful way. However, by observing how network ports
(services) are used, it is possible to capture the intent of each
transmission. In this paper, we present DANTE: a framework
and algorithm for mining darknet traffic. DANTE learns the
meaning of targeted network ports by applying Word2Vec to
observed port sequences. Then, when a host sends a new sequence,
DANTE represents the transmission as the average embedding of
the ports found that sequence. Finally, DANTE uses a novel and
incremental time-series cluster tracking algorithm on observed
sequences to detect recurring behaviors and new emerging
threats. To evaluate the system, we ran DANTE on a full year
of darknet traffic (over three Tera-Bytes) collected by the largest
telecommunications provider in Europe, Deutsche Telekom and
analyzed the results. DANTE discovered 1,177 new emerging
threats and was able to track malicious campaigns over time.
We also compared DANTE to the current best approach and
found DANTE to be more practical and effective at detecting
darknet traffic patterns.
Index Terms—Darknet, Network Telescope, Blackhole,
Word2vec, Machine learning, Clustering, Port Embedding
I. INTRODUCTION
One way for Internet service providers (ISP) to obtain mean-
ingful and actionable insights on malicious Internet campaigns,
is to analyze traffic arriving at a subset of unassigned IP
addresses. These IP addresses are sometimes referred to as a
darknet [1], [2]. In this paper, the term ‘darknet’ should not
be confused with anonymous communication networks such
as Tor.
Darknet IP addresses are not associated with any registered
host or services. Therefore, they are similar to honeypots [3], [4]
in that any incoming packets can be automatically considered
unwanted and non-productive. Previous studies have shown
that packets sent to darknet IP addresses are usually the result
of network probing/scanning, worm propagation, and a DDoS
attacks [5], [6]. Therefore, darknet data can be used by an
ISP’s cyber emergency response team (CERT) to infer threat
intelligence related to ongoing malicious activities or new
emerging attacks [7] (see Figure 1).
A great advantage to this approach is that darknet taps are
easily deployed, inexpensive to implement, and can collect vast
amounts of useful data. However, obtaining threat intelligence
from darknet traffic is a challenging task for three reasons:
(1) Darknet IPs are not assigned to actual hosts so the traffic
only captures the initiation of a communication, and not the
actual channel traffic (e.g., payloads). This is in contrast to
honeypots which emulate real services (e.g., a Web application
or SSH server). As a result, only metadata such as incoming
packet’s source IP (src IP), destination IP (dst IP), destination
port (dst port), and packet size are available. (2) Darknet traffic
is full of benign scanning activity from services/enterprises
such as Amazon, Google, and Shodan which must be filtered
out. (3) Attackers repackage old malwares (e.g., Mirai) and
reuse known attack patterns which makes it difficult to identify
novel threats. (4) Efficient algorithms are a necessity since
terabytes of darknet data is generated every month.
Recent works proposed various methods for analyzing
darknet traffic. Since the destination TCP or UDP port number
provides a good indication of the sender’s intentions (e.g.,
accessing port 23 may indicate an attempt to search for an
accessible Telnet server), most of the previous research has
focused on grouping ports into static clusters and detecting
peaks or unusual trends in the volume of the clusters or
individual ports [8], [7], [9], [10]. However, attacks are
becoming more sophisticated, automated, and noisy (in terms
of port access). For example, attackers may perform multi-
stage attacks or attempt to exploit multiple vulnerabilities to
compromise a device [11]. The methods proposed in previous
works (1) cannot identify attacks which use more than one
port in sequence, and (2) only perform one time clustering,
and therefore do not provide any means for tracking on-going
attacks, detecting a recurring/reused attack, or identifying novel
emerging threats over time.
In order to detect attacks it is important for a security analyst
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Fig. 1. Topological view of darknet analysis maintained by an ISP: (1) packets
sent to non-existing IPs are captured at taps, then (2) logs are aggregated and
sent to a cluster, and then (3) algorithms are used to generate emerging threat
intelligence for the CERT.
to be able to analyze darknet data and provide insights on an
hourly basis. However, this analysis is challenging as there are
terabytes of darknet traffic data every month and this figure
is expected to increase in the coming years. We believe the
solution to this challenge will be based on utilizing the power
of big data and using a distributed algorithm to provide hourly
reports and alerts.
In this paper, we propose Darknet Traffic Embedding
(DANTE), a novel darknet analysis method for representing,
monitoring, and detecting complex emerging threats via darknet
traffic. DANTE is designed to be scalable and work in a big
data architecture. DANTE accomplishes this in two steps. First,
for each time window, DANTE summarizes each hosts’ activity
as a feature vector which captures that host’s behavior. The
vector is made by (1) training a Word2vec [12] model on the
targeted ports (words) found in observed sequences (sentences),
and (2) summarizing newly observed port sequences from a
host as the average of the ports’ Word2Vec embeddings. The
second step is to cluster the feature vectors (host activities)
found in a time window, and use a novel technique to map
these clusters to the previous time windows. Briefly, (1) the
cluster labels from the previous time window are mapped to the
current clusters using Jaccard similarity measures (tracking),
(2) clusters which could not be mapped are then labeled using
a collection of one-vs-all classifiers (recurring concepts), and
then (3) the remaining unlabeled clusters are labeled by a
members of the CERT and are given a new 1-vs-all classifiers
(novelty detection).
To evaluate our method, we worked with the largest
telecommunications provider in Europe, Deutsche Telekom
AG. To support our research, they collected for us full year
of darknet traffic (over three Tera-Bytes) in which DANTE
discovered 1,177 new emerging threats and was able to track
malicious campaigns over time. Deutsche Telekom’s is now
using DANTE for threat intelligence in their CERT. We also
evaluated the current best approach [13] on the same dataset
and found that DANTE produced results were more concise
and significantly more effective at capturing attack patterns.
In summary, this paper provides the following contributions:
1) A scalable and online framework for analyzing darknet
traffic which can detect and track malicious campaigns
and behaviors over time.
2) A method for representing a sequence of accessed ports,
of variable length, as a numerical feature vector which
captures the intent of an attacking host in a meaningful
way.
3) A generic algorithm for performing temporal clustering
which can (1) track cluster drift, detect novel/emerging
clusters and reoccurring clusters, (2) run parallelized over
a big data cluster with multiple data sources, and (3) can
be used with any batch clustering algorithm according to
the user’s needs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
2 provides background information on darknet-related research
and embedding techniques. The proposed darknet monitoring
framework is presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we present
the proposed approach for port scan embedding. Section 5
contains a description of the novel temporal clustering method.
In Section 6 we present our experimental results and in Section
7 we conclude the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The two main contributions of this paper are (1) a method
for analyzing darknet traffic, and (2) a method for clustering
time series data using static clustering algorithms. Therefore, in
our review of related work, we address each subject separately.
A. Mining Darknet Traffic
In prior research [1], [2], [14], [7], [15], [10], [9], [16],
[17], [5], [18], [19], darknet data is used to detect botnet hosts,
typically by clustering and classifying the src IPs with features
such as the dst port and packet size.
In [17], the authors created a rule-based model to help
categorize darknet records into several types of malicious
attacks and benign activities, and showed how those categories
evolved over ten years of data. The authors used attributes
such as the number of source IPs and destination ports in
order to categorize the data. However, they did not consider
the sequence of destination ports coming from an IP. We found
those sequences to be particularly informative in the detection
of attack patterns as they can indicate the intention of the
attacker.
Ban et al. [7], [13], [15], [14] introduced a network incident
analysis center for tactical emergency response (NICTER) that
monitors around 300,000 darknet IPs in Japan. They used
NICTER to find correlations between the malicious activities
discovered on the darknet and activities extracted from different
types of honeypots. In [14], and later in [13], Ban et al. used
DT-growth, an association rule learning (ARL) algorithm, to
port associations in the darknet data. Their research serves as
the foundation of this paper, as they showed that many attacks
patterns use more than one port and thus should be grouped.
Thonnard and Dacier [20] created a new clustering tool to
detect groups of IPs that behave similarly. They used graph
theory in order to find temporal correlation between port usage
and thus created a way to group different IPs. Nevertheless,
this work is different from ours, as Thonnard and Dacier [20]
ignored the meaning and use of the ports in the sequence when
clustering.
In [21], the authors used DBSCAN to create clusters of
packets and then used an algorithm from the field of topological
data analysis in order to visualize the darknet and help an expert
easily observe and analyze the data. To use DBSCAN, they
treated the ports as integers by looking at the port number. In
contrast to this work, we use an artificial neural network to
learn the connections and relations between the ports to find
an informative numeric representation.
In order to retrieve numeric information from network traffic
packets, the majority of the research conducted extracted
statistical features such as the number of destination IPs
or unique ports [5], [22], [23], [24], [25], [26], [27], [21].
Although these features proved to help in the detection and
exploration of attacks, they are hand-picked, and it is difficult to
choose the features that fit the task. In contrast to those methods,
we used a neural network-based algorithm that automatically
extracts meaningful representations of the packets.
Most of the aforementioned works apply their method on a
static corpus of data. However, new data arrives continuously,
and there is a need for an online system that can detect attacks
in near real-time. To address this issue, our proposed method
periodically analyzes the packets that have arrived from the sen-
sor in the last L minutes and applies the detection mechanism
in an online fashion by using a big data architectures.
B. Temporal Clustering
The well-known of clustering algorithms, such as k-means
and DBSCAN [28], are batch algorithms. This means that
they are applied once on the entire dataset and cannot track or
monitor temporal trends. Although batch algorithms provide the
best clustering quality, they are unsuitable as-is for processing
data streams (unbounded sequences of observations).
To cluster data streams, one can use STREAM [29], In-
cremental DBSCAN [30], DenStream [31], CluStream, and
many others [32]. However, these algorithms cannot perform
novelty detection. In other words, they cannot differentiate
between reoccurring clusters and novel clusters. This capability
is required to detect emerging threats and monitor the re-use
of known attack variants.
There are several algorithms for novelty detection in data
streams [33], however these algorithms cannot be natively
parallelized over a big data computing cluster and do not
directly support the processing of multiple parallel sources.
Furthermore, each of these algorithms were designed to apply
the principles of a particular kind of clustering algorithm over
compressed data summaries. In addition to this being a lossy
process, a user may need a different type of clustering algorithm
to best fit the data (e.g., DBSCAN or K-means)). In contrast,
the temporal clustering framework that we propose in this paper
can be parallelized over a big data cluster while receiving data
from multiple sources. In addition, the framework is flexible in
terms of selecting a clustering algorithm. This enables the user
to apply the most suitable batch algorithm in his/her arsenal.
III. THE DARKNET ANALYZER FRAMEWORK
In this study, we analyze the ongoing activities in the darknet
by clustering common patterns/sequences of targeted (dst) ports.
These patterns can be used to discover new attacks as well as
explore the behavior of ongoing attacks and trends.
The analysis process consists of the four stages described
below.
1) Sequence extraction First, the data is split into sliding
time windows, resulting in multiple windows with length
L; for each time window, we group the destination port
records of the same src IP into a port sequence. The final
result is a table representing a time window with two
attributes, the first being the src IP, and the second being
the dst port’s sequence, as shown in Figure 3.
2) Port sequence embeddings By using a word embedding
algorithm on the port sequences extracted from the
previous stage and treating ports as words and port
sequence as sentences, we are able to transform the port
sequences into a meaningful numerical feature vectors. A
description of how we expand on this method is presented
in Section IV.
3) Temporal clustering With the feature vector obtained in
the previous stage, we use a novel temporal clustering
method to cluster the feature vectors over time. This step
enables us to track attack patterns and distinguish between
new (novel) and reoccurring patterns. This is explained
further in chapter V.
4) Alert logic and visualization The current time window’s
clusters and labels are visualized for the CERT team (e.g.,
trends, or campaigns by country source). We can also
use this information to create an alert rule, e.g., an alert
regarding the reappearance of a cluster that an analyst
classified as malicious in the past. These alerts can then
be used in security information sharing platforms such as
MISP [34].
In addition, the above-mentioned alert system will allow us
to use DANTE to deal with adversarial attacks. Such attacks
can be divided into two groups. In the first, the attacker is
trying to conceal him/herself by adding dummy port access
as noise. A simple way to deal with this attack group is to
include an alert rule that issues alert when a never seen before
cluster is seen, as those attacks will create a new cluster. To
avoid a mass amount of false positive, those alarm are only
sent if a cluster is larger than a certain threshold. In the second
attack group, the attacker will try to disguise him/herself as a
pattern that belongs to a known cluster, such as a cluster that
consists of a popular port sequence pattern. To deal with this
group, one can create an alert rule to issue an alert when a
cluster dramatically increases in size. Another way to deal with
this group of attacks is to recluster the large clusters and find
subpatterns within them; those clusters could help an analyst
find malicious subpatterns that differ from the other subclusters
and those can indicate hidden attempts.
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Fig. 2. An overview of the DANTE framework
Fig. 3. Time window extraction.
IV. PORT SEQUENCE EMBEDDING
Threat agents (e.g., an attacker or bot) may send packets to
unregistered IP addresses for several different reasons, such as
to find a host with a vulnerability to exploit or, in the case of
worms, to access a backdoor.
We define a sequence S as the sequence of ports collected
from a specific src IP to a specific dst IP.
A darknet sensor can observe these communications as a
sequence of ports being accessed. For example, the sequence
“42527, 80, 80” was observed in the wild. In this sequence, we
can see that the attacker tried to access a high port (42527),
and immediately send several packets to port 80 (HTTP); This
sequence reflects a worm’s attempt to detect if the target host
has already been infected (via backdoor on port 42527), and
then after failing, trying to compromise the host by exploiting
two different vulnerabilities in the host’s web server (port 80).
From this, we can understand that the port targets in a given
sequence reveal information regarding the intent of the attacker.
From this example, it can be seen that the sequence of targeted
ports not only reflects the attacker’s goal and strategy, but also
implicitly captures the type of threat agent. Moreover, threat
agents such as bots, worms, and hackers in the same campaign
act in unison enabling us to perform cluster analysis to detect
new or recurring campaigns and other behaviors.
However, in order to cluster those sequences, we must find a
representation which can summarize them as a numeric vector
for the machine learning algorithm. This format is a fixed
length vector x ∈ Rn where the euclidean distance between
vectors xi and xj vectors measure similarity (closer vectors
are more similar).
Although TCP and UDP ports are numbers, the numerical
relationship between ports is meaningless. For instance, port
21 is used for FTP, and port 22 is used for SSH, and there
is no connection between the two. Therefore, in order to
summarize the behavior of a scan, we first need to learn a
numeric relationship between all of the ports.
To accomplish this we use Word2Vec. Word2vec, presented
in [12] by Mikolov et al. , is a natural language processing
(NLP) algorithm that aims to maximize the co-occurrence
probability of words in the same sentence. Our method uses
the same basic algorithm, but instead of looking at words
in sentences, we use the port sequences where a sequence
from a specific src IP corresponds to a sentence, and the port
numbers correspond to the words in that sentence. Let p be a
TCP/UDP port in the set P = {0, 1, . . . 65, 536} of all ports.
Let s = {p1, p2, . . . pk} be a sequence of ports sent from a
specific src IP to a specific dst IP within some time interval L.
We train a Word2Vec model on a corpus of example sequences
S, such that a sequence s ∈ S is treated as a sentence and
p ∈ P is treated as a word.
The trained Word2Vec model is able to convert a port p
into a vector representation (embedding) ep ∈ Rn such that ep
captures the meaning of p given its observed locality among
other ports in sequences of S. An example of that property can
be seen by looking at port 23 and port 2323, both of which
are used for Telnet and hence are expected to appear in the
scan data interchangeably. Therefore, they have remarkably
similar embedding vectors. The same applies to arbitrary port
numbers which are dynamic or not well documented. By using
Word2vec, we do not need to consider the fact that multiple
ports use the same service as the embedding process does this
for us. Moreover, ports commonly found together in particular
attack patterns will be associated as well, thus ep captures the
attack intent as well.
Unlike more straightforward methods, such as Bag of Words
(BoW), Word2vec uses context windows in order to create the
representation of each word. This method considers not only
what other words are in the sentence, but also where they are,
allowing for a better representation.
In order to build this port-to-embedding transformation
model we need to supply it with a significant amount of scan
data, which could be computationally heavy. Fortunately, this
model does not have to be rebuilt in every time window, and
it is possible to use a pretrained model for a long period of
time. The intuition behind this rationale is that the uses of each
port do not change often and a well-trained model should be
sufficient for a considerable amount of time.
Additionally, there is no need to save the model itself once
trained. Instead of keeping the entire neural network model, one
can save a hash table where the key is the port number, and the
value is the embedding for that port. This approach reduces the
amount of data needed to be saved significantly, as the number
of possible ports is limited by the number 65,536. Further
more, by eliminating the need to execute a neural network,
DANTE can run extremely fast in a big data framework.
After each port has an embedding vector of size d, we
want to obtain an embedding vector with the same size, d,
that represents an entire port sequence P that contains s
number of ports. Although there are many methods for sentence
embedding, recent research [35] discovered that the best way
to do so is to average the embedding of each word in the
sentence. In the port embeddings case, We summarize the
overall behavior (intent) of s as a single vector es ∈ R by
computing the average of that sequence’s port embeddings.
Concretely, we compute
es =
1
k
k∑
i=1
epi (1)
The resulting feature vector can be used for any machine
learning algorithm, such as a classifier or clustering algorithm.
V. TEMPORAL CLUSTERING
As described in Section IV, it is possible to summarize
sequences of ports as their average embedding and analyze
their behavior by performing cluster analysis. However, it is
important to inspect the clusters over time. By doing so we
can: (1) detect new attacks as they emerge (novelty detection),
(2) track attack campaigns and how their strategies change, (3)
follow the re-use of known attacks, e.g., variants of the Mirai
botnet, and (4) analyze the trend of ongoing attacks, such as
changes in volume, sources, and targets.
However, darknet data is collected from X sources simul-
taneously. To manage this, the data it is typically stored in
a big data cluster such as Hadoop. Therefore, we propose a
temporal clustering framework which can be used with any
batch clustering algorithm. The framework operates as follows.
A. Windowing
First, we sort and aggregate the most recent data into
overlapping time windows. Let L be the width of the window
in minutes, and let S be the step size in which we slide the
window, where S < L. Following this process, let Ti be the i-th
time window in our data, where Ti+1 is the next sequential time
window. Finally, let the ratio of observations shared between
two neighboring windows be defined as
ri,i+1
|Ti| ∩ |Ti+1|
L
(2)
The overlap between neighboring windows is necessary in
order to track clusters. To ensure this, the parameter S should
be small enough so that 0.2 ≤ ri,i+1 ≤ 0.8.
B. Clustering
Next, we apply a clustering algorithm to the data of each
time window to group the observations. We note that any batch
clustering algorithm can be used. For example, K-means, Fuzzy
C-means, Gaussian mixture models, hierarchical clustering,
spectral clustering, and more. For our dataset, we found that
the clustering algorithm, DBSCAN [30], worked best. The
reason is because DBSCAN clusters data based on density. As
a result, the number of clusters discovered is variable and does
not need to be predefined (as in k-means). Another advantage
is that DBSCAN can label outliers (points which are relatively
far from the general distribution). This helps us analyze these
cases separately without harming the quality of the clustering
process.
C. Tracking
Between time window Ti and time window Ti+1, concept
drift can occur. This means that the number of clusters and
their shapes can change. Moreover, a cluster in Ti+1 can be a
current cluster (also found in Ti), an old cluster (found in Tj
where j < i), or a new cluster (never seen before). Figure 4
illustrates this challenge.
To annotate the clusters in Ti+1, we first find the current
clusters by comparing Ti and Ti+1. A cluster in Ti+1 is mapped
to a cluster in Ti if there is a significant overlap of observations
between them. We measure the overlap using the Jaccard
similarity metric, defined as
Jaccard(A,B) =
|A ∩B|
|A ∪B| =
|A ∩B|
|A|+ |B| − |A ∩B| (3)
The Jaccard similarity metric measures the similarity between
sets of items. This metric can be used in our case, because
adjacent time windows overlap (by L−S). As a result, clusters
which have a high Jaccard Similarity Score have a large number
of overlapping observations and thus are considered to be the
same pattern.
By using the distributed system, we simultaneously calculate
the Jaccard similarity of all of the clusters in Ti+1 with the
clusters in Ti. If the Jaccard similarity is above a certain
Fig. 4. An illustration of the challenge in mapping clusters found in different
time windows (data here has been projected as 2D using T-SNE [36]).
threshold for two clusters, then the cluster from Ti+1 is
considered to be the same as the cluster from Ti (i.e., current
cluster). In cases in which the Ti+1 cluster has no corresponding
cluster from Ti, the cluster is considered new. The algorithm for
mapping clusters between adjacent overlapping time windows
is presented in Algorithm 1. Note that there is no need to use
the embedding vector of each instance; only a key (the src IP
in our case) is needed for the comparison.
Algorithm 1 The cluster mapping algorithm for the current
and previous time windows
Require: Ti, Ti+1, Threshold
Ensure: ClusterToClusterMapping
1: ClusterToClusterMapping ← emptylist
2: for all p ∈ Ti do:
3: for all k ∈ Ti+1 do:
4: Sim← Jaccard(p, k)
5: if Sim > Threshold then
6: ClusterToClusterMapping[p]← k ;
D. Recovery & Discovery
Algorithm 2 The recovery & discovery algorithm for finding
older appearances of a cluster
Require: TI,c,MS, Threshold
Ensure: TrackedCluster
1: N ← NumberOfInstances(TI,c)
2: TrackedCluster ← emptyString
3: for all M ∈MS do:
4: C ← 0
5: for all I ∈ TI,c do:
6: PI ← P (Yi = 1|M)
7: C ← C + PI
8: Cnormalized ← C/N
9: if Cnormalized > Threshold then
10: TrackedCluster ←M.name
The cluster mapping process presented in the previous
Section enables us to align the clusters with the previous time
window, but we also want to be able to identify witch of the
clusters are recurring concepts (to retrieve their annotations), as
well as novel concepts. Because storing the entire past data is,
in most cases, impractical, our approach is to build a classifier
model for each of the observed clusters. Each model is a binary
one-vs-all classifier trained on the time window where the said
cluster was first seen. The instances that belong to the cluster
get the label one, and the rest get the label zero. We found that
Random Forest suits this problem well as this model, unlike
classifiers such as K nearest neighbors, have no need to save
the data points and only need to save the decision trees. We
define the set of one-vs-all classifiers as M .
Let M be our database of our one-vs-all classifiers and let
c be a cluster in Ti+1 which we could not map to Ti. The
probability that c belongs cluster cj represented by mj ∈M ,
is computed as
p(c, cj) =
1
|c|
|c|∑
i=1
predictmj (esi) (4)
where predictm(x) returns the probability that x belongs to the
positive class using model m. We assign c with the annotation
of cluster cj if p(c, cj) obtains the highest probability for
all models in M , and p(c, cj) > β for some user defined
parameter β (we set β = 0.7). Similarly to the Jaccard
similarity calculation, one can easily distribute the prediction
part as those predictions can also be calculated simultaneously.
A formal description is described in Algorithm 2.
In cases in which there is no match in any of the classifiers
in M , we consider cluster c to be a new cluster. Once a new
cluster is found we train a new classifier on this cluster’s data
as previously explained.
After some time, a concept drift may occur, and the patterns
change slightly. To deal with this issue, in cases in which a
known cluster appears in the data stream, we update and retrain
the corresponding model.
VI. ANALYSIS OF DARKNET TRAFFIC
Unlike other methods that used darknet data streams, e.g.
[18], DANTE is not trying to find anomalies on specific ports,
but rather find concepts and trends in the data. While methods
that find correlations between ports exist [13], (1) they operate
offline detecting patterns months after the fact, and (2) do
not track the patterns over time. In contrast, DANTE finds
new trends online (within minutes) and can detect recurring
and novel patterns. To the best of our knowledge there are
no online algorithms for detecting and tracking patterns in
darknet traffic. Therefore, we demonstrate the usefulness of
the proposed approach through a case study on over a year of
data. The data was collected from a greynet [37], [7], meaning
that the unused IPs are from a network that is populated by
both active and unused IP addresses.
A. Configuration and Setup
a) Dataset.: For the purpose of this research, the NSP
established 1,126 different unused IP addresses across 12
different subnets. All traffic which was sent to these IPs were
logged as darknet traffic. The traffic was collected in three
batches; the first was recorded during a period of six weeks
Fig. 5. An overview of the different clusters in the data during the data collection period, aggregated by hour. Each color represents a different cluster.
(44 days) from 10/25/2018 until 12/5/2018 (denoted by Batch
1), the second was recorded during a period of eight weeks (55
days) from 2/1/2019 until 3/26/2019 (denoted by Batch 2) and
the third batch was recorded during a period of 37 weeks (257
days) from 21/1/2019 until 10/6/2019 (denoted by Batch 3).
Note that Batch 2 and Batch 3 have 36 days of overlapping,
that is because the Batches 1 and 2 recorded in the research
phase of the project, where Batch 3 recorded in the deployment
stage, in real time. A deep analysis was performed on Batches 1
and 2. Batch 3 was used to demonstrate the system’s long-term
stability. In total, 7,918,787,884 packet headers from 4,887,568
different source IP addresses were recorded, resulting in over
3 terabytes of data. Figure 6 shows the number of packets and
source IP addresses for every hour in the first two batches.
Note that due to a technical problem, one hour at the end of
October is missing. Because the missing time is insignificant,
and the proposed method can deal with missing time windows,
those missing values do not affect the overall results.
b) Configuration.: We choose the step size S to be one
hour and the window length L to be four hours, similar to
the work of Ban et al. [13]. A one hour step size provides
a sufficient amount of data while granting a security expert
enough time to react to a detected attack. In addition, we
choose the epsilon parameter of DB-SCAN to be 0.3, and the
minPts parameter to be 30, as those parameters resulted in an
average of four new clusters every day (agreed by the security
experts to be a reasonable number of clusters to investigate
each day). In addition, we do not want clusters with a small
number of src IPs, as those clusters are too small to represent
a significant trend in the network, and thus should be treated
as noise.
c) Scalable Implementation.: To scale to the number
of sources and amount of data, DANTE was implemented
and evaluated at the NSP’s CERT using Spark a Hadoop
architecture. We tested the method on a Hadoop cluster
consisting of 50 cores and 10 executors. The algorithm takes
approximately 62 seconds to extract, embed, cluster, and map
each four hours time window.
d) Data Preprocessing.: As most of the source IPs in
the dark data only sent one or two packets during the period
of data collection, we decided to remove them as those port
sequences associated with those IPs are too short and cannot
constitute a meaningful pattern. Filtering those IPs reduce the
noise and therefore improve the results. In addition, some of
those IPs are likely to be a random miss configuration and not
an active malicious attack. By removing those IPs, we reduced
the number of packets by 33% percent.
B. Results
Because of time constrains, we use Batch 1 and 2 for
a comprehensive analysis, and show that DANTE can find
malicious attack within hours, long before the first online
report. Batch 3 is used to prove that the algorithm can work
over a long period of time, and can detect new and reoccurring
clusters even after almost a year. A visualisation of Batches 3
clusters over the 10 months can be seen in Figure 8.
A total of 400 clusters (novel darknet behaviors) were
discovered over Batches 1 and 2, and 1,141 clusters were
discovered over Batch 3. As previously mentioned, the system
discovered four new clusters each day, on average, as can be
seen in Figure 7. This number, determined by the set parameters,
is small enough for an analyst to evaluate but large enough to
detect new concepts. We found that the vast majority of the src
IPs belong to one of 16 large clusters (concepts) over the year.
Some of these clusters reoccurred (e.g., botnet code reuse)
and others always stayed present (e.g., worms looking for
open telnet ports). Figure 5 plots the volume of the discovered
clusters over time for Batches 1 and 2. The x-axis represents
time, and the y-axis represents the total number of src IPs
in the data for each hour. In the visualization component of
DANTE (section III) this graph is updated periodically to help
the analysts explore past and current trends.
The clusters discovered by DANTE can be roughly divided
into four categories:
Fig. 6. The hourly number of different packets (orange) unique src IPs (blue) in the darknet after the data preprocessing stage.
Fig. 7. Number of newly discovered clusters over time in the Batch 1 data
(daily).
Fig. 8. Hourly number of sequences over 10 month of data, by their types.
1) Service Recon Clusters whose sequences have six or
more unique ports:Either benign web scanners or agents
performing reconnaissance on active services.
2) Basic Attacks & Host Recon Clusters whose sequences
consist of a single port: Agents trying compromise a device
via a single vulnerability, or performing reconnaissance
to discover active network hosts.
3) Complex Attacks Clusters whose sequences have two to
five unique ports: Agents which are attempting to exploit
multiple vulnerabilities per device, are performing multi-
step attacks, or are worms.
4) Noise and Outliers A single cluster of benign sequences
from misconfigurations, backscatter, or are too small to
represent an ongoing trend.
In Table I we give statistics on these categories, and in
Figure 8 we present the volume of each category in Batch 3
over time. Table II provides concrete examples of discovered
attack patterns, by cluster, as labeled in Figure 5.
1) Service Recon: Service reconnaissance (port scanning)
is performed by attackers to find and exploit backdoors or
vulnerabilities in services [17]. In Batches 1 and 2, we
identified 51 port scanning clusters with an average of 929
different ports scanned in each cluster. However, it is important
to note that a cluster in this group is not necessarily malicious.
For example, cluster A in Figure 5 consists of src IPs of
Censys, a security company which scans 40 ports to find and
report vulnerable IoT devices. Interestingly, because of the
embeddings, DANTE found that 2.2% of the IPs in cluster
A do not belong Censys’ subnet. Rather, we verified them to
belong to a malicious actor copying Censys to stay under the
radar.
In some cases, the service recon can consist of multiple
ports that belong to the same service, in order to use an exploit
on this service even if the host is using an alternative port.
For example, Cluster B, occurred on 3/8/2019, consist only of
ports that can be associated with HTTP. This cluster consists
of 17 ports, such as 80, 8080, 8000, 8008, 8081 and 8181. In
addition, most of the src IPs are located in Taiwan (18%), Iran
(15%) and Vietnam (12%). Because DANTE assigns similar
embedding to those ports, those port were group together and
DANTE was able to detect this pattern and issue an alert. At
the time of writing of this article, we were not able to find
any information on this scan online. This lack of reports could
be explained by the fact that there was no significant peak in
any of the ports involved, which make it hard for conventional
anomaly detectors to detect this pattern.
2) Basic Attacks & Host Recon: Many port sequences
consist of a single port accessed repeatedly on or more times.
This behavior captures agents which are trying to exploit a
single vulnerability (e.g., how the Mirai malware compromises
devices via telnet). This behavior is also consistent with network
Scanning [17], where the attacker tries to detect live hosts to
map out an organization. By following how campaigns (clusters)
are reoccur and grow in volume over time, analysts can use
TABLE I
THE NUMBER OF CLUSTERS, SRC IPS, AND PACKETS FOR EACH OF THE FOUR CLUSTER FAMILIES.
No. of clusters No. of src IPs No. of packetsClusters Type Batch 1 Batch 2 Batch 3 Batch 1 Batch 2 Batch 3 Batch 1 Batch 2 Batch 3
Service Recon 24 27 326 16,909 78,644 101,316 9,603,305 39,111,889 162,499,127
Basic Attacks & Host Recon 77 71 202 246,864 313,457 1,216,077 50,937,141 56,881,565 380,244,017
Complex Attacks 78 121 610 351,318 395,109 2,602,184 19,203,613 85,960,212 1,085,777,577
Noise and Outliers 1 1 1 115,645 142,920 819,566 582,646,403 743,977,834 5,935,419,695
Fig. 9. A Gantt chart of cluster re-occurrence. Each horizontal bar represents a different cluster. Darker color represents more packets in the cluster.
DANTE to find trends and discover new vulnerabilities. For
instance, Figure 10 contains a scatter plot of each port sequence
cluster from Batch 1 and its corresponding port.
It is interesting to see that, for example, port 445 is accessed
by many src IPs, each of which only accessed the port an
average of 5.8 times. This type of cluster can be seen in the
second largest cluster, C. This cluster consists of port 445
(SMB over IP: commonly used by worms such as Conficker
[38], [6], [39] to compromise Windows machines) and was
being attacked at a low rate, once every few hours. However,
DANTE also detected that port 5060 (SIP: used to initiate and
maintain voice/video calls) was trending, being attacked at a
high rate from the USA.
Nonetheless, most of the clusters in this category are
relatively small and only appear for a few hours. In another
example, DANTE detected a network recon campaign between
1:00 and 6:00 AM GMT on 11/25/2018 (cluster D) on the
unused port of 11390. The attack consisted of 895 different
src IPs which mostly targeted one out of our 1,129 darknet
IPs. This indicated which subnet the campaign was targeting
and provided us with threat intelligence on a possible software
vulnerability/backdoor on port 11390. By using the distributed
system, DANTE was able to issue an alert with that information
about a minute after the data arrived.
3) Complex Attacks: These clusters capture patterns involv-
ing multiple attack steps or vulnerabilities. This category of
clusters often captures the most interesting attack patterns,
and the most difficult to detect because of their low volume
of traffic which hides them under the noise floor. Moreover,
without the proposed embedding approach, an attack which
involves a sequence of ports would be clustered with the other
Basic Attacks and thus the other ports in the attack would
go unnoticed –making it impossible to distinguish from other
Fig. 10. A view of the Basic Attacks clusters from Batch 1. Each dot represents
a cluster with the corresponding port shown above. Note that both the x-axis
and the y-axis are logarithmic.
attack campaigns.
We note that cluster E contains %30 of all darknet sequences.
This is because the cluster captures ports 23 and 2323 (which
the embedding correctly associated together) Both ports are
used for Telnet, and they are connected with the Mirai botnet
and are likely to appear in every darknet scanner from the last
few years [39].
One example of this category occurred on 3/4/2019,
where DANTE reported a new large cluster appeared (F
in Figure 5) consisting of two ports and originating from
China and Brazil only. Here, 92% of the src IPs sent the
sequence {9527, 9527, 9527}, and 8% of the src IPs sent
{9527, 9527, 9527, 5555, 5555, 5555} and in the reverse order.
This is a clear indication of one or more campaigns launched
at the same time aiming to exploit a new vulnerability. Four
days after DANTE detected the attack, the attack was reported
TABLE II
THE NUMBER OF SRC IPS, PACKETS, AND A SEQUENCE EXAMPLE FOR EACH OF THE MENTIONED CLUSTERS.
Cluster
Name Category Number of src IPs Number of Packets Sequence Examples
A Service Recon 141 873,458 [2077, 2077, 8877, 7080, . . . , 9304, 3556]
B Service Recon 20,982 2,061,655 [8000, 88, 80, 8000, 8081, 80, 80]
C Basic Attacks & Host Recon 113,407 7,061,042 [445, 445, 445]
D Basic Attacks & Host Recon 895 68,065 [11390, 11390, . . . , 11390, 11390]
E Basic Attacks & Host Recon 285,651 42,225,387 [23, 23, 2323]
F Complex Attacks 43,305 1,718,440 [9527, 9527, 9527, 5555, 5555, 5555]
G Complex Attacks 535 7,270 [7550,7550,7547,7547,7547]
H Complex Attacks 43,305 105,258 [7379, 7379, 5379, 5379, 6379, 6379]
[40] and related to a vulnerability in an IP-Camera (CVE-
2017-11632). Interestingly, none of the reports mentioned that
the attackers were also targeting port 5555. This not only
demonstrates how DANTE can provide threat intelligence, but
how DANTE can detect ongoing attacks.
A third example of this category can be seen in a cluster,
G, from 11/22/18, which was discovered by DANTE. This
cluster contains a pattern of scanning two specific ports, 7547
and 7550, which occurs on 11/22/2018 from 5 to 9 PM GMT.
According to the Internet Storm Center (ISC) port search [41],
a free tool that monitors the level of malicious port activity,
this is the most significant peak of activities for port 7550 in
the past two years, however, to the best of our knowledge, there
have been no reports of an attack that utilizes this port. The
missing information in the reports could suggest a novel attack
that utilize those two ports. In addition, port 7547 appears to
have a large number of packets arriving each day at 10:00 AM
GMT, that were assigned to a different cluster. Unlike cluster
G, that cluster consists of port 7547 alone with no additional
ports in the scan. 12/22/2018 is the only day when activity
on this port peaks in a different hour (see Figure 11). There
are reports [42] of a known Mirai botnet variant that uses port
7547 to exploit routers. Based on this report we attribute cluster
G to Mirai activity. Since DANTE detected that the two ports
are used interchangeably by the same src IPs, we suspect that
there is a new vulnerability tested on port 7550 of routers. At
the time of writing of this article existence or absence of such
vulnerability was not yet confirmed by any organization.
On 10/31/2018, DANTE generated an alert about a new
attack (cluster H) one minute after it began. This attack
continued everyday from 11/15/18 until the 11/18/18. In the
attack, 1,789 different network hosts sent exactly four packets
to two or three of the ports: 5379, 6379, and 7379. According
to the ISC, this is the largest peak in the use of port 5379
and the third largest peak for port 7379, although these ports
are considered unused. We could not find any report online
which identified these ports being used together in an attack.
Identifying the source of these IPs can lead a CERT team to
uncovering an ongoing campaign.
In addition, 44.8% of the detected patterns (clusters) in this
group reappeared on a later date (in some cases, one or two
weeks later), sometimes with minor changes such as adding
or removing some of the ports in the scan. Figure 9 presents
Fig. 11. The number of packets that arrived to port 7547 during the week of
11/21/2018, where each color represents a different cluster. The first cluster
(orange) occurs each day at 10:00 AM GMT; the second cluster (gray) is
small and occurs continuously during the week. DANTE detected the reported
anomaly (blue) which occurred at 5:00 PM 11/22/18.
a Gantt chart of those reoccurring clusters. In the case of the
reoccurring patterns, DANTE did not send an alert regarding
a new attack pattern but did report a new occurrence of the
known pattern.
4) Noise and Outliers: This category consisting of a single
cluster, with the patterns that the DBScan algorithm defined as
outliers. Those patterns are port sequences that are not large
enough, in terms of the number of src IPs, to become a new
cluster. The rationale behind this is that most of the traffic
in this category is backscatter or misconfigurations packets,
and thus does not represent a scan [17], [37]. Although some
of the patterns can represent a scan, those kinds of patterns
cannot indicate a trend due to their small volume. The size
of this cluster is directly controlled by the minPts parameter
in DBScan and can be changed at any time. As previously
mentioned, we chose minPts to be 30 in order to create a
reasonable number of clusters per day for a security expert to
explore.
C. Comparative Discussion
In the previous sections, we demonstrated that DANTE can
detect new and reoccurring attack patterns. As mentioned in
section II, methods such as [20], [14], [13], [17] can detect
TABLE III
TOP 20 BIGGEST BATCH 1 CONCEPTS ACCORDING TO DANTE AND BAN ET AL.
Ban et al. [13] DANTE
Port 1 Port 2 Occur. Port 1 Port 2 Port 3 Port 4 Port 5 Port 6 Occur.
23 5,783,748 23 2323 33,439,191
2323 1,637,119 37215 15,294,071
2323 23 1,577,142 445 4,404,525
445 982,528 80 8001 8080 8081 8088 and 10 other ports 3,699,342
80 886,540 80 8080 433 3,355,387
37215 672,897 22 2,697,434
8080 539,976 8080 8081 2,403,517
8081 383,209 3389 3398 9833 3839 8933 1,383,441
5555 322,826 5555 937,267
8080 80 277,633 1433 3413 850,124
37215 23 244,212 1235 different ports 798,760
81 187,815 80 8080 615,490
3389 178,766 3389 139 445 11211 519,732
8443 158,892 21 482,898
32764 132,361 81 463,355
1433 130,363 1252 different ports 344,761
9000 129,044 443 343,922
22 122,518 8080 8000 8333 and 44 other ports 237,758
80 23 106,023 123 47808 161 1883 8883 501 195,431
21 104181 5900 5901 5431 150,234
port scanning (access to many different ports per host), and
methods such as [17], [20], [43], [44] can observe traffic spikes
on individual port numbers. However, DANTE is able to detect
both port scans and port spikes while distinguishing between
them. Furthermore, because DANTE uses Word2vec, it is able
to cluster meaningful patterns consisting of different ports
that have the same meaning/intent. For example, cluster B
consists of port sequences which revolve around a specific
type of service. Therefore, DANTE can detect both simple and
complex patterns.
The greatest advantage of DANTE is its ability to detect
patterns from the Complex Attacks category (e.g., CVE-2017-
11632). This family, consisting of multiple ports per sequence,
captures many well known and dangerous malwares. Table
IV exemplifies this claim by listing some of these malwares
along with the ports which they access during their lifetime.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no other works which
can detect these kinds of patterns as quickly and accurately as
DANTE. Concretely, [20], [17], [21], [43], [44] observe traffic
on individual ports. Although [14], [13] finds the connection
between ports, it ignores the meaning and the content of the
sequences. Another example is that [20] would not be able
to detect cluster G that consist of ports 7547 and 7550 as it
looks for common temporal activities spike of ports. While
port 9537 had a significant spike at this date, there were no
spike in the usage of port 5555 as so the two ports would not
be clustered together. In contrast, DANTE uses the embedding
of the ports to find the connection between them in near real
time, and found that this is the first occurrence of those two
ports together and issued an alert to the CERT within minutes,
four full days before the first online report.
D. Comparison with Ban et al. [13]
To evaluate the contribution of using Word2vec as a means
for mining meaningful patterns, we compare our embedding
approach to Ban et al. [13]. Ban et al. used a frequent pattern
mining (FPM) algorithm called FP-growth on darknet traffic
to group similar ports together. By using FPM, Ban et al. was
able to find subsets of ports that occur together in the data.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the most recent work
that mines patterns in darknet traffic to find new concepts. We
applied their method on Batch 1 using the same time windows.
By using the same parameters and aggregations, we were able
to extract the groups of ports and their number of occurrences
(support). The top 20 largest subsets of both FPM and DANTE
are presented in Table III.
While FPM detects different subsets of ports, it can not
identify when different subsets are jointly used in novel
attack patterns. This can be seen in cluster F, where DANTE
clusters two different sets together, the set [9527] and the
set [5555, 9527]. This clustering led to the discovery of port
5555 being used against Wireless IP Camera 360 devices in
vulnerability CVE-2017-11632. In addition, Ban et al.’s method
omits all sequences with more than six different ports, while
these patterns are important in detecting malicious service
reconnaissance. For example, in cluster A DANTE discovered
a malicious actor who was copying Censys’s port scanning
behaviors.
By using the semantic embedding of ports, DANTE learns
that different ports which behave similarly (i.e., using the
same service) should be considered close in the embedding
space. That is why in cluster E, DANTE clustered together
appearances of port 23 and port 2323 (both used by Telnet).
On the other hand, the FPM algorithm could only create a set
for every permutation of the ports although they all capture
the same concept (see the three biggest FPM sets in Table III).
Moreover, some ports typically appear in attack sequences
and rarely appear alone. This means that there is semantic
information which can be learned about these ports, such as
the intent and how it is reflected on the other ports in the
sequence. For example, in Table III, port 80 (HTTP) is a single
concept according to FPM due to the FP-growth process. In
contrast, DANTE re-associates port 80 with other patterns.
This can be seen in the top 20 largest concepts where port 80
appears in six different concepts but never appears by itself;
in FPM, the singleton [80] is the fifth largest subset.
Lastly, FP-growth creates a large number of sets, even when
setting the minimum support parameter to be a relatively large
value (1,819 sets with minimum support of 1,000 for a period
of six weeks). The resulting number of sets is impractical
for a CERT analyst to investigate. An advantage of using
DANTE is that only a reasonable number of concepts with
high importance are identified per day (average of four a day,
as shown in Figure 7). At the same time, DANTE discovers
small yet significant patterns that might represent dangerous
attacks (such as cluster G).
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
By mining darknet traffic, analysts can get get frequent
reports on on-going and new merging threats facing their net-
work. In this paper, we presented DANTE: a framework which
enables network service providers to mine threat intelligence
from massive darknet traffic streams. The framework provides
(1) a novel method for representing a set of targeted ports as
an embedding which captures the intent of the attack, and (2)
a system for clustering, tracking, and detecting old and new
attack patterns.
By evaluating DANTE on real darknet traffic, we were
able to confirm that DANTE can track and detect reoccurring
and new attack patterns. For example, the system detected a
reported attack on IP cameras on the 3/4/2019. Furthermore,
we discovered some attacks which have not been reported. For
example, the patterns involving ports [5379, 6379, 7379] which
appeared on the 10/31/2018. We also compared DANTE to a
well-known darknet mining algorithm and found that DANTE
produced higher quality and results with practical outputs.
DANTE is currently being deployed in Deutsche Telekom’s
networks to provide their CERT with better threat intelligence.
As future work, we plan to improve DANTE by learning a
semantic relationship between the port-embeddings and other
features such as geo-location, ttl, packet size, and others.
We hope that the framework described in this paper, the
embedding and clustering techniques, will assist researchers
and the industry in better securing the Internet.
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